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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3689 
__________ 
 
LINCOLN DAVE LEVYS, JR., 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN V. SHAMLIN; WILLIAM D. MATHIAS;  
MORSE, of the City of Pittsburgh P.D. Zone 3 (personal and official capacity);  
CITY OF PITTSBURGH P. D.  Zone 3 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 16-cv-01624) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2019 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 24, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Lincoln Levys appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment in his civil rights case.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Levys filed a complaint1 alleging that certain police officers (the Defendants), and 
the City of Pittsburgh, violated his Fourth Amendment rights in connection with 
unreasonable searches and seizures on September 11, 2014.2  The Defendants moved to 
dismiss those claims on the grounds that:  (1) Levys failed to allege facts to support a 
plausible Fourth Amendment claim against the officers; and (2) the officers were, at a 
 
1 The District Court construed Levys’s “Opposition and Response to Defendants [sic] 
Motion for Definitive Statement and Motion to Strike/Dismiss,” Dkt. #35, and his “Brief 
and Response to Motion for Clarification,” Dkt. #44, as a Third Amended Complaint; we 
will do likewise.  The District Court had stricken Levys’s original complaint and his First 
Amended Complaint for failure to comply with local rules, and the District Court had 
treated Levys’s Second Amended Complaint as having been superseded by the filings at 
Dkt. ##35 and 44.  See District Court orders at Dkt. ##5, 13, 43 and 45. 
 
2 Based on the alleged Fourth Amendment violation, Levys also raised a claim of 
municipal liability under Monell v. N.Y. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), against the City of Pittsburgh.  Additionally, he presented claims against the 
officers under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and two criminal 
statutes.  The District Court dismissed Levys’s Due Process claims under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments as duplicative of his Fourth Amendment claim, 
dismissed the criminal violation claims for lack of standing, and denied the Monell claim 
on the merits.  Dkt. #66 at 6, 7 n.6, 15.  Levys does not challenge the rulings concerning 
the criminal statutes and the Monell claim on appeal, so we need not discuss them 
further.  See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
issue was waived by failure to raise it on appeal).  To the extent Levys seeks to pursue on 
appeal constitutional claims under amendments other than the Fourth, we agree with the 
District Court that those claims are subsumed by his Fourth Amendment claim, and that 
those amendments do not provide a separate basis for relief.  See Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994). 
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minimum, entitled to qualified immunity.  Because the Defendants attached a number of 
exhibits to their motion to dismiss, and because Levys similarly attached matter outside 
of the pleadings to his response, the District Court converted the Defendants’ motion to 
one for summary judgment and allowed time for any additional submissions.  Having 
received none, the District Court then granted the Defendants’ motion on the grounds that 
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.  Levys timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise a plenary standard of 
review and apply the same standard as the District Court to determine whether summary 
judgment was appropriate.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 
F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus, we would normally view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Levys.  See Kaucher v County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  
However, as the District Court noted, at summary judgment, the non-moving party 
cannot simply rest on his complaint, but must establish a genuine dispute as to a material 
fact “by ‘citing to particular parts of . . . the record, including depositions, documents, 
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, 
interrogatory answers, or other materials.’”  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, 
L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)).  Given 
the evidence produced by the Defendants and Levys’s failure to support his assertions of 
factual disputes, we agree with the District Court that the officers were entitled to 
summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.   
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Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages 
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982).  The qualified immunity inquiry has two parts:  (1) whether the plaintiff 
demonstrated the deprivation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was 
established at the time of the alleged deprivation.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001).  The Court may address either part of the inquiry first.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  In the first part of the inquiry, courts must carefully define, at the 
appropriate level of specificity, the right that allegedly has been violated.  Sauers v. 
Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711, 716-17 (3d Cir. 2018).  But even where a 
constitutional right has been violated, the qualified immunity standard allows “ample 
room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sauers, 905 F.3d at 718-
19 (affirming grant of qualified immunity, even though officer’s actions were conscience-
shocking, as “constitutional liability for actions taken in conscious disregard of a great 
risk of harm during the course of a police pursuit” was not clearly established at the time 
of the incident).    
The right at issue here is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Levys claimed that the officers violated 
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his Fourth Amendment rights by:  (1) conducting an investigatory stop without 
reasonable suspicion; (2) searching his yard without consent or probable cause; (3) 
searching his home without consent or probable cause; and (4) wrongly placing him 
under arrest.  In considering whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we 
need not determine whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation in the first place; 
rather, we consider only whether the officers’ conduct violated a clearly established 
constitutional right “of which a reasonable person would have known.”  See Mullenix v. 
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 
We turn first to the officers’ investigatory stop of Levys.  Searches and seizures 
without warrants are presumptively unreasonable, but there are exceptions, one of which 
is a “brief, investigatory seizure commonly called [a] ‘Terry stop.’”  United States v. 
Hester, C.A. No. 16-3570, 2018 WL 6259314, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018) (citing Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).  A police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop 
when there is “‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2014) 
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).  Such a “reasonable 
suspicion” of criminal activity “‘is dependent upon both the content of information 
 
3 Thus, the fact that a state court granted Levys’s motion to suppress does not preclude a 
finding of qualified immunity.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 
(1987) (“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in 
some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we 
have indicated that in such cases those officials—like other officials who act in ways they 
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possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’”  Id. at 397 (quoting Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).  While a mere hunch is not sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion, “the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary 
for probable cause.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).  
In the night in question, several reports had been made to the 9-1-1 dispatcher that 
two individuals were involved in a shooting on the 1400 block of Amanda Street and had 
fled by foot; that two blocks away, there was a prowler in the yard near Levys’s residence 
at 1215 Amanda Street; and that the prowler had discarded clothing in the yard.4  As 
Officer Shamlin approached Levys’s residence in response to the calls, he saw Levys, 
who confirmed that he had just come from his house.  Officer Shamlin then signaled two 
officers in a patrol car traveling the opposite direction to stop Levys.  The two officers 
stepped out of the car, stopped Levys, and began to search his person.5  The officers 
informed him that they had received reports of a prowler in a nearby yard following the 
earlier gunfire.6  Officer William D. Mathias arrived shortly thereafter and stated that the 
 
reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held personally liable.”). 
4 This information is imputed to the officers for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
inquiry.  See United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
5 Levys argues that the officers approached him with hand on their guns, and that they 
immediately handcuffed him.  But Levys does not point to any evidence in the record to 
support his assertions. 
 
6 Levys argues, in turn, that there was no caller, and that the caller was anonymous.  But 
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police had received a third call indicating that Levys was the “right person.”  Considering 
the totality of the circumstances, reasonable officers in the Defendants’ shoes would not 
have believed that detaining Levys was a violation of his constitutional rights.  See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (noting that officer can consider totality of 
the circumstances in determining whether he or she has probable cause).7 
Second, reasonable officers would not have believed that going into Levys’s yard 
was a violation of his constitutional rights, since they had reason to believe that a second 
person (possibly armed) might be there after fleeing the shooting scene.  See Warden, 
Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (concluding that exigent 
circumstances allowed police to search home without warrant where they were seeking 
suspect from armed robbery).  Accordingly, when the officers saw the marijuana plants in 
Levys’s yard, in plain view, their decision to seize the marijuana and arrest Levys was 
also justified.8  See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462-63 (2011) (“[L]aw enforcement 
 
again, he does not support those statements by any reference to evidence in the record.  In 
contrast, the police dispatch records produced in the District Court reflect several callers, 
and it appears that at least some of those callers identified themselves by name and 
address (although that information was redacted before it was included in the record). 
7 Levys cites Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000), in which the Supreme Court 
held that an anonymous tip, without more, did not give police reasonable suspicion for a 
stop and frisk.  But in that case, the call was made from an unknown location by an 
unknown caller, and the caller did not provide any reasonable basis for the police to 
suspect J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct.  Here, the caller provided a name and 
location, and apparently gave a nearly eyewitness account to the 9-1-1 operator about a 
prowler discarding clothing. 
 
8 For these reasons, the defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to 
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officers may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth 
Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is 
made.”).9 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.10 
 
Levys’s Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution based on 
the criminal charges against him for the marijuana plants. 
   
9 Levys’s claim that the search of his house was illegal fails because the officers testified 
under oath that Levys’s fiancée consented to the search.  Levys did not point to any 
record evidence to refute that assertion, and in his brief here, he says that he “assumed 
[his fiancée] gave them permission to search the house because how else would they have 
gotten in?”.  Appellant’s Brief at 4. 
   
10 Levys’s “Response to Defendants [sic] Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental 
Appendix” appears to be, in essence, a reply brief.  But to the extent that he is asking us 
to overturn the Clerk’s Order granting the Appellees’ motion to file a supplemental 
appendix, his request is denied.  
